کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7387446 | 1480670 | 2018 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی انرژی
انرژی (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Resource and Energy Economics - Volume 51, February 2018, Pages 1-17
Journal: Resource and Energy Economics - Volume 51, February 2018, Pages 1-17
نویسندگان
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Jean-Christophe Poudou, Sébastien Roussel,