کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7415783 | 1482076 | 2018 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms' tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies' tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs' business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs' decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies' decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy - Volume 37, Issue 3, MayâJune 2018, Pages 241-253
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy - Volume 37, Issue 3, MayâJune 2018, Pages 241-253
نویسندگان
Tien-Shih Hsieh, Zhihong Wang, Sebahattin Demirkan,