Government effectiveness, regulatory compliance and public preference for marine policy instruments. An experimental approach

Democratic governance of natural resources requires democratic accountability. To explore the antecedence of public preference for marine policy instruments, this study revisit previous research findings linking inefficient political institutions to demand for more coercive policy tools. Thus, the aim of this study is to investigates the influence of 1) effectiveness of authorities and 2) regulatory compliance among resources users on the public preference for marine policy instruments. A 2×2 between-subject scenario experimental approach was utilised, where the effectiveness of authorities and regulatory compliance of shrimpers varied. Respondents were asked to rank three different marine policy instrument: 1) tougher penalties for noncompliance, 2) dialogue between authorities and resources users and, 3) tradable quotas. The results from the scenario experiment demonstrate that ineffective authorities increase the preference for tougher penalties. A potential explanation for this finding is that regulation implies less discretion, and hence regulation is preferred when public institutions are inefficient.