Quota swapping, relative stability, and transparency

One of the oldest elements of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the principle of 'relative stability'. Relative stability means that yearly established Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for each fish stock are divided between the Member States of the European Union (EU) according to a fixed allocation key. One way to circumvent the relative stability is the (increasing) practice of swapping quota with other Member States. These swaps have a temporary character, but continuously repeated yearly swaps occur. In recent decades many Member States have shifted resource management responsibilities more towards the industry and the process of quota swapping is in several Member States managed by Producers Organisations (POs) rather than by government administrations. Networks of fishermen and POs try to establish solid relationships and try to put at the same time stability and flexibility into the system. Information and networks play an important role in the process of quota swapping. However, not all POs and fishermen tend to have (equal) access to the required information for quota swapping which raises questions on how transparent this process is. With the upcoming implementation of the landing obligation, the quota swaps between Member States are expected to increase further. This paper describes the extent and the practice of quota swapping, the implications for one of the principles of good governance, transparency, as well as the effects of swapping for the relative stability.