Does threat of mutually assured destruction produce quasi-cooperation in the mackerel fishery?

This paper uses a quarterly, game-theoretic model of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel to study the fishing strategies of five players: the EU, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and the international fishery on the high seas. Data on the spatial distribution of fish catches (1977-2011) are used to model changes in the distribution of the mackerel stock. The Nash equilibrium solutions predict a severe decimation of the stock through overfishing, either by parties (Iceland, the Faeroe Islands) that refuse to cooperate or by a general absence of cooperation. There is a wide discrepancy between this prediction and reality, as the stock seems, at most, only moderately overexploited, despite non-cooperation by Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. It is conjectured that these parties, and others, may engage in a degree of quasi-cooperation that falls somewhat short of full cooperation but avoids the extreme destruction of the Nash equilibrium. This tacit cooperation can be seen as being maintained by a mutually assured destruction of the fisheries of all parties in case they go to the logical extremes of non-cooperation.