From primitive identity to the non-individuality of quantum objects

We consider the claim by Dorato and Morganti (Grades of individuality. A pluralistic view of identity in quantum mechanics and in the sciences. Philosophical Studies, 163 (2013) 591-610) that primitive individuality should be attributed to the entities dealt with by non-relativistic quantum mechanics. There are two central ingredients in the proposal: (i) in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, individuality should be taken as a primitive notion and (ii) primitive individuality is naturalistically acceptable. We argue that, strictly understood, naturalism faces difficulties in helping to provide a theory with a unique principle of individuation. We also hold that even when taken in a loose sense, naturalism does not provide any sense in which one could hold that quantum mechanics endorses primitive individuality over non-individuality. Rather, we argue that non-individuality should be preferred based on the grounds that such a view fits better the claims of the theory.