Material translations in the Cartesian brain

This article reexamines the controversial doctrine of the pineal gland in Cartesian psychophysiology. It argues initially that Descartes' combined metaphysics and natural philosophy yield a distinctly human subject who is rational, willful, but also a living and embodied being in the world, formed in the union and through the dynamics of the interaction between the soul and the body. However, Descartes only identified one site at which this union was staged: the brain, and more precisely, the pineal gland, the small bulb of nervous tissue at the brain's center. The pineal gland was charged with the incredible task of ensuring the interactive mutuality between the soul and body, while also maintaining the necessary ontological incommensurability between them. This article reconsiders the theoretical obligations placed on the pineal gland as the site of the soul-body union, and looks at how the gland was consequently forced to adopt a very precarious ontological status. The article ultimately questions how successfully the Cartesian human could be localized in the pineal gland, while briefly considering the broader historical consequences of the ensuing equivalence of the self and brain.