The discrete-time bioresource sharing model

The discrete-time game model of bioresource management is analysed. The centre (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors, and the players (countries) harvest the fish stock in their territory. The cases of finite and infinite planning horizon’s are investigated, and Nash and cooperative equilibria are derived. A new type of equilibrium – cooperative incentive equilibrium, is investigated in which the centre punishes players for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium by changing the harvesting territory. Some properties of the optimal strategies obtained are proved. A Computer simulation and a comparison of payoffs and population dynamics are carried out for different player behaviour scenarios.The main aim of this paper is to apply an approach developed by the authors,1, 2 and 3 to the bioresource sharing problem for two players and to investigate cooperative incentive equilibrium. This concept was introduced by Ehtamo and Hamalainen4 as a natural extension of Osborn’s approach5 to cartel stability.The main results of this work were published in Ref. 6.