Anchors and norms in anonymous pay-what-you-want pricing contexts

• We find that consumers report voluntarily payments that are more than zero in anonymous pay-what-you-want (PWYW) exchanges.
• Reported PWYW payments are influenced by numbers in the purchase context such that voluntary payments are greater when a higher (vs. lower) number is provided (anchoring effects).
• Numbers that set descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms are more predictive of reported voluntary payments in some cases. Reported payments tend to be closer to a number that represents an expected price when it is framed as the average amount others pay rather than when it is framed as suggested price from the firm.

In this paper, we examine whether firm-supplied numbers influence reported payments in anonymous pay-what-you-want (PWYW) exchanges. PWYW allows consumers to select any level of voluntary payment. Using two experiments, we find that consumers voluntarily report payments greater than zero on average in the absence of social pressure. Further, reported voluntary payments are influenced by numbers in the exchange context. When higher numbers are present, consumers respond by reporting they would make higher payments. However, the meaning of the number is also important. When the number represents a descriptive norm (what others are doing), it is more predictive of reported payments compared to a number that represents an injunctive norm (what is the “correct” thing to do) in some cases. Our results indicate that PWYW may indeed be feasible for products that are purchased anonymously and that firms can strategically provide information that affects payments.