کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
881889 1471563 2014 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game: Are there brains in games?
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بار شناختی در بازی معضل چند نفره زندانی: آیا مغز در بازی وجود دارد؟
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


• Differences in cognitive resources imply differences in strategic behavior.
• We manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a cognitive load.
• We find evidence that the low load subjects behave more strategically.
• Low load subjects exhibit more strategic defection near the end of play.
• Low load subjects are better able to condition their behavior on previous outcomes.

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics - Volume 51, August 2014, Pages 47–56
نویسندگان
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