کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
883522 1471660 2014 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental evidence
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental evidence
چکیده انگلیسی


• Experimental test of the Political Coase Theorem (PCT).
• Commitment problems undermine the validity of the PCT.
• Commitment issues matter, and the existence of more commitment possibilities leads to better social outcomes.
• Moreover, we find that the link is valid when commitment possibilities are asymmetrically distributed between players and even when a redistribution of political power is required to take advantage of those possibilities.

The Political Coase Theorem (PCT) states that, in the absence of transaction costs, agents should agree to implement efficient policies regardless of the distribution of bargaining power among them. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to explore how commitment problems undermine the validity of the PCT. Overall, the results support theoretical predictions. In particular, commitment issues matter, and the existence of more commitment possibilities leads to better social outcomes. Moreover, we find that the link is valid when commitment possibilities are asymmetrically distributed between players and even when a redistribution of political power is required to take advantage of those possibilities. However, we also find that at low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by our parameterized model while the opposite is true at high levels of commitment, and only large improvements in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social surplus, while small changes do not.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 103, July 2014, Pages 17–38
نویسندگان
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