Scale manipulation in dictator games

• Subjects estimate behavior and expectations of others before playing dictator games.
• Transfers respond to manipulations of the quantitative scales for the estimates.
• The effect is stronger when dictators guess the transfers expected by recipients.
• Scale manipulation can be used to affect specific beliefs and to study their causal effects on behavior.

We let subjects estimate behavior and expectations of others before they play dictator games, and only vary the quantitative scales for their estimates. Our data show that this manipulation may significantly affect economic decisions: dictators who are presented a scale with a higher midpoint transfer on average more than dictators who are presented a scale with a lower midpoint. The effect is stronger and significant in a treatment where dictators are asked to guess the average transfer expected by the recipients, compared to a treatment where they are asked to guess average transfers. Our experiment suggests that scale manipulation can be used in laboratory social interaction to systematically affect specific beliefs and to study their causal effects on behavior.