کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883695 | 912345 | 2012 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

A small segment of credit default swaps (CDS) on residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) stand implicated in the 2007 financial crisis. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of too interconnected to fail (TITF) resulting, as in the case of AIG, of a tax payer bailout. We provide an empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Call Reports for off balance sheet bank data for the 4th quarter in 2007 and 2008. The propagation of financial contagion in networks with dense clustering which reflects high concentration or localization of exposures between few participants will be identified as one that is TITF. Those that dominate in terms of network centrality and connectivity are called ‘super-spreaders’. Management of systemic risk from bank failure in uncorrelated random networks is different to those with clustering. As systemic risk of highly connected financial firms in the CDS (or any other) financial markets is not priced into their holding of capital and collateral, we design a super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality of the banks which can mitigate potential socialized losses.
► First paper to construct an empirically calibrated Financial Network for the US credit default swap market.
► We give a topological characterization of ‘too interconnected to fail’ (TITF). This is reflected in the high concentration or localization of financial exposures between few participants who are identified as ‘super-spreaders’.
► We show that the propagation of financial contagion in TITF networks is distinct from that in uncorrelated random networks.
► As systemic risk of highly connected financial firms in the CDS (or any other) financial markets is not priced into their holding of capital and collateral, we design a super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality of the banks which can mitigate potential socialised losses.
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 83, Issue 3, August 2012, Pages 627–646