کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
883741 1471675 2013 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t
چکیده انگلیسی

We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950–2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems. Based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951–2000 for 146 countries, we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political leaders, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 88, April 2013, Pages 47–61
نویسندگان
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