Sequential Internet auctions with different ending rules

Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. The hard close auction involves a fixed deadline, while the deadline in the soft close auction may be extended if at least one bid is submitted in the final few minutes. Thus, the soft close allows buyers to submit ofter observing the opponent's bids even in the last minutes. Ending rules change both the seller's and the buyers’ strategies. In a sequential auction with the soft close, buyers have a stronger incentive to wait for low reserve prices in the future, and a seller chooses lower reserve prices.

► We model a sequential auction with a soft close ending rule.
► We examine difference of reserve prices and revenues between two ending rules.
► The seller posts a higher reserve price in hard close auctions than in soft close auctions.
► Both auction formats lead to the same allocation including the allocation period.
► The same allocation in the both auction formats lead to the same revenue in each period.