کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
883796 1471676 2013 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe
چکیده انگلیسی

Numerous papers show how game theory can improve our understanding of literature. There is no paper, however, using experimental economics to arrive at a new understanding of a play. We fill this gap by using experimental evidence to compare the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe. In the final version of the play, there are two stag hunt games, one without pre-game communication and one with. In the first game players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium but in the second one they do, which is consistent with experimental evidence. In the penultimate version of the play, there is pre-game communication in the first stag hunt game but players fail to coordinate to the efficient equilibrium, which is not consistent with experimental evidence. By removing the pre-game communication from the first game, Molière adapted his play as if he had been a student of modern behavioral game theory.


► We use experimental economics to compare the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe.
► The penultimate version is not consistent with experimental evidence.
► The final version is consistent with experimental evidence.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 87, March 2013, Pages 66–72
نویسندگان
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