کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883804 | 912353 | 2012 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.
► We use the randomized-response technique to increase anonymity in the dictator game.
► Giving almost disappears if anonymity is implemented via RRT.
► Additionally, we control for the appropriateness of applying RRT.
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 74–81