کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883808 | 912353 | 2012 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. We find that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13–20 percent) over the hard-close format. One possible theoretical explanation for these results is that the hard-close ending rule accommodates the practice of sniping, which leads to a lower expected selling price. We find empirically that a lack of experience could help to explain why, in spite of the revenue differences, some sellers select the hard-close ending rule.
► We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule.
► We found that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13–20 percent) over the hard-close format.
► One possible theoretical explanation for these results is that the hard-close ending rule accommodates the practice of sniping, which leads to a lower expected selling price.
► We find empirically that a lack of experience could help to explain why, in spite of the revenue differences, some sellers select the hard-close ending rule.
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 129–136