کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883814 | 912353 | 2012 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
► This paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game.
► Two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game.
► Pre-play communication has a significantly lower impact on cooperation when intra-play communication is possible.
► The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 207–219