کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
883935 912361 2010 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Inequality aversion and efficiency with ordinal and cardinal social preferences—An experimental study
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Inequality aversion and efficiency with ordinal and cardinal social preferences—An experimental study
چکیده انگلیسی

In this paper, we report on a series of free-form bargaining experiments in which two players have to distribute four indivisible goods among themselves. In one treatment, players are informed about the monetary payoffs associated with each bundle of goods; in a second treatment only the ordinal ranking of the bundles is given. We find that in both cases, inequality aversion plays a prominent role. In the ordinal treatment, individuals apparently use the ranks in the respective preference orderings over bundles of goods as a substitute for the unknown monetary value. Allocations that distribute the value (money or ranks, respectively) most equally serve as natural “reference points” for the bargaining processes. Frequently, such “equal split” allocations are chosen by our subjects even though they are Pareto dominated. Whether a Pareto optimal allocation is chosen or not depends on whether or not it is a Pareto improvement relative to the “equal split” reference allocation. We find less Pareto-damaging behavior due to inequality aversion in the ordinal than in the cardinal treatment.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 76, Issue 2, November 2010, Pages 238–253
نویسندگان
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