کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883993 | 912363 | 2010 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision](/preview/png/883993.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We study a one-shot information aggregation problem in which agents have to provide effort in order to understand the information they are supposed to process. Agents have a common interest in reaching a good decision but suffer from an individual cost of providing effort. Showing that any problem which is incentive compatible for a single information processor is incentive compatible for a decentralized organization, but not vice versa, we derive a new rationale for decentralized information processing. For a class of problems, the fastest organization – the reduced tree proposed by Radner (1993) – yields also the best incentives for information processing.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 76, Issue 3, December 2010, Pages 734–747
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 76, Issue 3, December 2010, Pages 734–747
نویسندگان
Hans Peter Grüner, Elisabeth Schulte,