کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
883995 | 912363 | 2010 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study](/preview/png/883995.png)
We study decision-making and the associated coordination problems in an experimental setting with network externalities. Subjects decide simultaneously in every round how much to invest out of a fixed endowment; the gain from an investment increases with total investment, so that an investment is profitable iff total investment exceeds a critical mass. The game has multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria; we find that whether first-round total investment reaches critical mass predicts convergence towards the Pareto optimal full-investment equilibrium. Moreover, first-round investments and equilibrium convergence vary with critical mass and group size in a complex way that is explicable by subtle effects of strategic uncertainty on decision making.
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 76, Issue 3, December 2010, Pages 759–773