Measuring the impact of information aggregation mechanisms: An experimental investigation

This paper measures the effectiveness of market-based and cheap-talk information aggregation. Both information aggregation mechanisms (IAMs) are frequently used prior to IPOs and sales of Treasury bonds – it is largely acknowledged that they provide agents with useful information for subsequent bidding. In a laboratory experiment, we study how information provided by IAMs interacts with private and public information and how agents integrate it in their strategic behavior in a multi-unit common-value uniform-price auction. In market-based IAMs, information gathering prevails and subsequent bidding shows that subjects acknowledge the precision of information. However, in cheap-talk IAMs, there is almost no transmitted information.

► We compare the effectiveness of market-based and cheap-talk information aggregation mechanisms (IAM).
► In a laboratory experiment, we study how information provided by IAMs interacts with private and public information and affect bidding behavior in a multi-unit common-value uniform-price auction.
► In market-based IAMs, information gathering prevails and subsequent bidding shows that subjects acknowledge the precision of information.
► In cheap-talk IAMs, there is almost no transmitted information.