کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884091 | 912372 | 2010 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Exchange, theft, and the social formation of property
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We design a laboratory experiment to explore whether and how property endogenously arises in a specialization and exchange environment where “theft” is costless. Additional treatments make available optional private protection mechanisms. We find that although an absence of exogenous enforcement does not hamper property's emergence in all cases, the private options tend to worsen outcomes on average. Property emerges when subjects self-organize groups, understand potential gains from trade, convince group members that all benefit by avoiding theft, and display credible commitment to cooperation in their actions. In other words, as Hume argued in 1740, property is a convention.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 74, Issue 3, June 2010, Pages 206–229
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 74, Issue 3, June 2010, Pages 206–229
نویسندگان
Erik O. Kimbrough, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson,