کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884203 912378 2009 14 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pure numbers effects, market power, and tacit collusion in posted offer markets
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Pure numbers effects, market power, and tacit collusion in posted offer markets
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no-power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 72, Issue 1, October 2009, Pages 475–488
نویسندگان
,