کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884205 912378 2009 18 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
eBay’s proxy bidding: A license to shill
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
eBay’s proxy bidding: A license to shill
چکیده انگلیسی

We introduce a bidding strategy which allows the seller to extract the full surplus of the high bidder in eBay auctions. We call this a “Discover-and-Stop” bidding strategy and estimate that 1.39 percent of all bids in eBay auctions are placed by sellers (or accomplices) who execute this strategy. We argue that this kind of shill bidding is unnecessarily effective due to eBay’s proxy system and the predictability of other bidders’ bids. We also model eBay auctions with shill bidding and find that, in equilibrium, eBay’s profits are higher with shilling than without it. Finally, to determine whether bidders have an incentive to bid on their own items, we mimic the bidding behavior of shill bidders in actual eBay auctions and find some evidence of the strategy’s success.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 72, Issue 1, October 2009, Pages 509–526
نویسندگان
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