کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884223 | 912379 | 2010 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations](/preview/png/884223.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and “smallness” properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 73, Issue 2, February 2010, Pages 254–258
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 73, Issue 2, February 2010, Pages 254–258
نویسندگان
Burkhard Hehenkamp, Alex Possajennikov, Tobias Guse,