کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884367 912387 2009 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Hierarchy and opportunism in teams
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Hierarchy and opportunism in teams
چکیده انگلیسی

We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 69, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 39–50
نویسندگان
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