کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884416 | 912390 | 2008 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Tie-breaking rules and divisibility in experimental duopoly markets
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie-breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between sellers in case of a price tie. A change in divisibility is modeled by making the sellers’ price space finer or coarser. We find that the incidence of perfect collusion is significantly higher under the sharing tie-breaking rule than under the random (coin-toss) one, especially when the price space is less divisible.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 67, Issue 1, July 2008, Pages 164–179
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 67, Issue 1, July 2008, Pages 164–179
نویسندگان
Daniela Puzzello,