کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884515 1471686 2008 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments
چکیده انگلیسی

Experimental economists believe (and enforce the idea) that researchers should not employ deception in the design of experiments. This rule exists in order to protect a public good: the ability of other researchers to conduct experiments and to have participants trust their instructions to be an accurate representation of the game being played. Yet other social sciences, particularly psychology, do not maintain such a rule. We examine whether such a public goods problem exists by purposefully deceiving some participants in one study, informing them of this fact, and then examining whether the deceived participants behave differently in a subsequent study. We find significant differences in the selection of individuals who return to play after being deceived as well as (to a lesser extent) the behavior in the subsequent games, thus providing qualified support for the proscription of deception. We discuss policy implications for the maintenance of separate participant pools.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 68, Issues 3–4, December 2008, Pages 477–488
نویسندگان
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