کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884541 | 912398 | 2007 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Accumulating evidence suggests that the outcomes of laboratory public goods games reflect individually differing preferences and beliefs. We designed a public goods experiment with targeted punishment opportunities to (a) confirm subject heterogeneity, (b) test the stability of subjects’ types, and (c) test the proposition that differences in group outcomes can be predicted by knowing the types of individuals who compose those groups. We find that differences in the inclination to cooperate have persistence and that significantly greater social efficiency can be achieved by grouping less cooperative subjects with those inclined to punish free riding while excluding those prone to perverse retaliation against cooperators.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 62, Issue 4, April 2007, Pages 495–521
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 62, Issue 4, April 2007, Pages 495–521
نویسندگان
Umut Ones, Louis Putterman,