کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884691 | 912409 | 2007 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Parochial corruption
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی
Enforcement problems are frequently acute in illegal transactions such as bribery. However, if a government official and a member of the public share informal social or economic ties, this may enable them to enforce bribe transactions by “linking the games”. As a result, officials’ incentives to engage in corruption may be affected by the social structure of the society in which they are embedded. We show that governments wishing to deter parochial corruption will usually prefer to punish only the official receiving the bribe, not the bribe-payer.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 73–87
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 73–87
نویسندگان
Christopher Kingston,