کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884821 | 912419 | 2006 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Common-pool resources (CPRs) typically involve interaction where precise information about payoffs is absent. However, all experimental studies of CPRs we are aware of study environments where the payoff structure is known. In this paper we address the behavioral consequences of two degrees of information on the mapping between decisions and payoffs. We run two treatments, one with complete information on the payoff structure and one with none. Remarkably, aggregate behavior is not significantly different between the two treatments. In both cases the aggregate tendencies converge to the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the best-reply dynamics organize individual behavior in both treatments remarkably well.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 55–69
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 55–69
نویسندگان
Jose Apesteguia,