کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884823 | 912419 | 2006 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Entry and exit with information externalities
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In the paper we analyze how the possibility of revealing information to a competitor alters the entry/investment behavior of a first entrant. We show that after entering the market, the firm might refrain from making further profitable investments in order to hide information from the competitor. Moreover, we show that before entering, the firm anticipates a strategic advantage in choosing an initially small scale of entry: in this way it “commits” itself to revealing the true state of the market with its subsequent decisions and this fact is beneficial since it induces the competitor to postpone entry into market.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 85–99
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 85–99
نویسندگان
Stefano Comino,