کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884825 912419 2006 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems
چکیده انگلیسی

The paper focuses on the creation of information for decision-making when agents’ effort is non-observable and rewards are indirect, that is, only based on the final decision. Following Dewatripont and Tirole [Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1999. Advocates. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1–39], the paper shows that the creation of advocates of special interests, as opposed to non-partisans, generates an efficient mechanism of mutual monitoring that reduces the scope for manipulation. Such monitoring is preferable over imposing penalties for detected manipulation; it is also preferable to creating an agency that monitors the non-partisan agent. Applications to transfer price policies and comparative judicial systems are considered.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 112–128
نویسندگان
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