کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884825 | 912419 | 2006 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The paper focuses on the creation of information for decision-making when agents’ effort is non-observable and rewards are indirect, that is, only based on the final decision. Following Dewatripont and Tirole [Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1999. Advocates. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1–39], the paper shows that the creation of advocates of special interests, as opposed to non-partisans, generates an efficient mechanism of mutual monitoring that reduces the scope for manipulation. Such monitoring is preferable over imposing penalties for detected manipulation; it is also preferable to creating an agency that monitors the non-partisan agent. Applications to transfer price policies and comparative judicial systems are considered.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 112–128
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 112–128
نویسندگان
Giuliana Palumbo,