کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884848 | 912425 | 2006 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the strategic effect of a difference in timing of verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing, the principal receives additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if (1) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or (2) steep incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 59, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 89–107
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 59, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 89–107
نویسندگان
Roland Strausz,