Ostensive gestures come first: their role in the beginning of shared reference

In developmental psychology pointing gestures are widely accepted as the gesture that par excellence allows shared reference ( Cyrulnik, 2002; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006), and as the basic form of gestural reference (Leavens, Hopkins & Bard, 2008; Pika, 2008). However, in semiotics, it is ostensive gestures that are considered to be the first instance of active signification, that is, gestures where an object occupies a prominent place as an instrument of communication (Eco, 1976). In this paper, coming from the pragmatics of the object perspective (Rodríguez & Moro, 1998), we argue that it is not pointing but ostensive gestures that come first. Specifically, we argue that: (1) ostensive gestures are gestures; (2) a developmental understanding of gestures suggests that children understand and produce ostensive gestures before pointing gestures, and adults produce ostensive gestures with objects in a shared space with the child at a very early age long before pointing gestures; (3) a theoretical and pragmatic conceptualization of objects beyond their “physical” level is required. Objects are cultural products with public functions; as a consequence, objects are also powerful instruments of communication between people, especially during the first years of life, and not simply the setting that surrounds the communicative event. Finally, we discuss the implications of these notions for developmental psychology, going beyond the declarative and imperative functions. We discuss three new functions of ostensive gestures: (1) for oneself with an exploratory and/or contemplative function, (2) private with a self-regulatory function in order to solve a problem, and (3) to another with an interrogative function.