On the grounding of syntax and the role of phonology in human cognition

Chomskyan generative grammar has long been committed to the ‘double-interface’ assumption that the faculty of language (FL) serves two interfaces, PF and LF, and correlatively that expressions have phonological and semantic properties. The paper argues this gives rise to (a) a grounding problem for syntax – i.e. for the interpretable content of syntax – and (b) a problem for the assumption that FL is a generative computation. It is argued these problems are resolved if we think of syntax as grounded exclusively in semantic/conceptual properties. Since this implies that FL is phonology-free, it is argued that FL should not be distinguished from a generative computation describable as ‘the language of thought’ (LOT). The paper explores to what extent this (FL=LOT) thesis is consistent with Chomsky's thinking. Chomsky's recent work can be seen as pointing in that direction but it is not consistent with the double-interface assumption, which he continues to regard as conceptually necessary. In the light of discussion of the issues, the paper concludes with a speculation on the role of phonology in human cognition and its evolution.

► Syntactic objects grounded in both phonology and semantics are uninterpretable.
► Nor could such objects be generated by a natural, universal computation.
► Phonology-free semantically grounded objects are naturalistically generable.
► The language faculty and the language of thought should therefore be identified.
► Phonology allows a form of access to the computation essential to human cognition.