کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957936 928835 2010 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Capital structure and earnings manipulation
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Capital structure and earnings manipulation
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double-moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his effort, investment is below the optimal level and production effort is socially inefficient. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payoff when production is unsuccessful. Ex ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase investment and improve effort.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economics and Business - Volume 62, Issue 5, September–October 2010, Pages 367–382
نویسندگان
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