کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
958540 | 929029 | 2010 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Board composition after mergers, does it matter to target shareholders? Board composition after mergers, does it matter to target shareholders?](/preview/png/958540.png)
This paper examines whether post-merger board composition affects the premiums paid to target shareholders. Using a sample of 207 stock-for-stock mergers from 1996 to 2004, we show that target merger premiums vary inversely with target director representation on the post-merger board. We also provide some evidence that both inside and outside target directors may trade shareholder wealth for board seats in the combined firms. However, we do not find board ownership moderates the relation between target merger premiums and post-merger board composition. Consistent with previous studies of management incentives in mergers, our empirical evidence supports the non-perfect agency theory. That is, target directors may sacrifice target shareholder interests to obtain a seat on the post-merger board.
Journal: Journal of Empirical Finance - Volume 17, Issue 5, December 2010, Pages 837–851