کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959033 | 929116 | 2011 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
► Collusion on the level of remanufacturability increases profit and consumer surplus.
► The regulation is better supported by the industry when firms are in competition.
► The environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus.
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 62, Issue 3, November 2011, Pages 337–351