کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
959054 929122 2008 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
چکیده انگلیسی

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions. The conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. This theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments. This paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated, large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 55, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 163–174
نویسندگان
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