کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959061 | 929124 | 2007 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Non-binding voluntary agreements
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In reality, most voluntary agreements (VAs) with polluters are not enforceable in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce firms’ commitments. We examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an efficient level of environmental protection when they are obtained under the legislative threat of a pollution quota. We show that they can improve social welfare relative to legislative intervention when lobbying congress is very effective and when the polluter and the regulator do not discount future costs and benefits heavily. These findings suggest that VAs should be used selectively, taking into account sector characteristics and the degree of influence of lobbying on congress.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 54, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 32–48
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 54, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 32–48
نویسندگان
Matthieu Glachant,