کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959129 | 929146 | 2006 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal enforcement policy and firms’ emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 51, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 110–131
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 51, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 110–131
نویسندگان
Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo,