کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959367 | 929226 | 2007 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Management of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper characterizes a dynamic contract that allows renegotiation and variable transfer payments (VTP) between owners of two independently-harvested, ecologically-dependent mammal populations. The decision environment is modeled as a two-person differential game. We develop a recursive-efficiency criterion that forms the basis for determining the size of the VTP, which makes the bargaining contract renegotiation-proof and self-enforcing. We further show that the VTP is just as Pareto-efficient as a lump sum or fixed annual transfer payment. A nuisance wildlife species management forms a basis for numerical illustration.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 54–67
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 54–67
نویسندگان
Mahadev G. Bhat, Ray G. Huffaker,