کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960989 | 929766 | 2013 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
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چکیده انگلیسی
The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank's performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank's performance is sufficiently poor. I show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a whole loan sale involving both credit risk retention based on ABS credit default swaps and credit enhancement in the form of a reserve account. The optimal securitization bears out rulemaking recently proposed in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act on a number of controversial provisions. I argue that further efficiency gains could be reaped by extending the role of the “premium capture” account into a liquidity buffer capturing performance-based compensation as a way of increasing skin in the game over the life of the transaction.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation - Volume 22, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 30-54
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation - Volume 22, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 30-54
نویسندگان
Henri Pagès,