کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
961035 929772 2011 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Security-voting structure and bidder screening
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Security-voting structure and bidder screening
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper demonstrates that non-voting shares can promote takeovers. When the bidder has private information, shareholders may refuse to tender because they suspect to sell at an ex post unfavourable price. The ensuing friction in the sale of cash flow rights can prevent an efficient change of control. Separating cash flow and voting rights alters the degree of cross-subsidization among bidder types. It can therefore be used as an instrument to promote takeover activity and to discriminate between efficient and inefficient bidders. The optimal fraction of non-voting shares decreases with managerial ability, implying an inverse relationship between firm value and non-voting shares.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation - Volume 20, Issue 3, July 2011, Pages 458-476
نویسندگان
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