کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
965060 | 930690 | 2007 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managerial control inside the firm
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue the long-term viability of a firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuring, this mechanism diminishes firm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also offers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behavior, such as restructuring aversion, survival motive, and excessive risk aversion. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (3) (2007) 324-335.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies - Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 324-335
Journal: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies - Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 324-335
نویسندگان
Shinichi Hirota, Kohei Kawamura,