کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
967107 931153 2009 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit
چکیده انگلیسی
Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 56, Issue 5, July 2009, Pages 725-743
نویسندگان
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