کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
968069 931440 2006 33 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bank supervision and corruption in lending
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Bank supervision and corruption in lending
چکیده انگلیسی

Which commercial bank supervisory policies ease—or intensify—the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance? Based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries, this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms’ financing obstacles. We find that the traditional approach to bank supervision, which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor, discipline, and influence banks directly, does not improve the integrity of bank lending. Rather, we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance. In extensions, we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 53, Issue 8, November 2006, Pages 2131–2163
نویسندگان
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